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Code.3 Post-Jevic, courts have had to evaluate whether proposed structured dismissals violate the
priority scheme in a way that they had not before. Moreover, courts have confronted suggestions
to expand Jevic’s limitation on structured dismissals to bankruptcy sales and even beyond
conflicts with the priority scheme. However, courts have been reluctant to expand Jevic beyond
its core holding.
Discussion
A. Legal Basis for Structured Dismissals
First, section 349(b) of the Bankruptcy Code prescribes the effect of the dismissal of a
case, “[u]nless the court, for cause, orders otherwise…”4 Second, “11 U.S.C § 1112 (b) certainly
contemplates that a dismissal may be granted when it is in the interests of creditors.” 5Thirdly,
section 305(a)(1) highlights a court’s discretion to “dismiss a case… if the interests of creditors
and the debtor would be better served” by a dismissal.6 Courts exercise broad discretion as
granted in sections 349(b), 1112(b), and 305(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code to approve structured
dismissals despite seeming to violate the rules and structure of chapter 11. Notably each of these
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code grant courts discretion where it is in the best interest of the
creditors, and the debtor, to deviate from the general rules prescribed. Undeniably, this is to
maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate – one of the maxims of bankruptcy. However,
expanding the value of the estate to the extent possible is not the only maxim of bankruptcy.
Maintaining the structure of the distribution priority scheme is another bankruptcy maxim which,
at times, exists as a competing goal that may not allow for maximization of the value of the
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Id. at 978.
11 U.S.C. § 349(b) (2018) (emphasis added).
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Buffet, 2014 WL 3735804 at *2 (“…the court shall convert a case under this chapter to a case under 7 or dismiss a
case under this chapter, whichever is in the best interests of creditors and the estate.…”). 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1)
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estate. This inevitably raises the question – where maxims of bankruptcy are competing in a
single instance, which one rules?
In 2017, the United States Supreme Court confronted this issue in In re Jevic Holding
Corp.7 Post-Jevic, courts are reluctant to limit their discretion to balance contradicting interests
in maxims of bankruptcy beyond Jevic’s holding.
B. Jevic’s Holding
In 2017, Jevic presented the Supreme Court with two novel issues: first, the
permissibility of structured dismissals under the Bankruptcy Code; and second, if permissible,
whether, when in contrast, the absolute priority rule, or the discretion of the court acting in the
best interest of the debtor and its creditors to approve structures dismissals, reigned supreme.8
Ultimately, the Court held that structured dismissals that do not violate the “basic priority rules”
are permissible.9
In the wake of Jevic, courts have been forced to take a closer look at structured dismissals
beyond the best interest of the debtor and its creditors. Although Jevic established that courts
may not approve structured dismissals where they violate the priority rules of the Bankruptcy
Code, the decision opened the door to a host of new arguments against structured dismissals. In
fact, courts have even been confronted with questions about extending Jevic beyond structured
dismissals to section 363 sales.
C. Arguments Against Chapter 11 Sales and Structured Dismissals Pre-Jevic
Structured dismissals largely came into existence because they were favored to maximize
value of the estate more efficiently than a chapter 11 plan. Courts have also permitted structured
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dismissals as evidenced by reading their practice of approving structured dismissals into the
Bankruptcy Code where the words “structured dismissal” do not appear. However, even before
Jevic, there were arguments against the permissibility of structured dismissals in some or even
all circumstances.
i. Structured Dismissals as Sub Rosa Plans
Proposed plans or sales may be objectionable as sub rosa “when aspects of the transaction
dictate the terms of the ensuring plan or constrain parties. . . by [restricting] creditors’ rights to
vote on a plan.”10 Sales may be objectionable as sub rosa if they “ha[ve] the practical effect of
dictating some of the terms of any future reorganization plan.” 11In addition to implementing
voting restrictions, this could include “provid[ing] for the release of claims by all parties against
[the debtor], its secured creditors, and its officers and directions” leaving “little prospect or
occasion for further reorganization.”12 Sub rosa plans are prohibited based on the belief that
“[t]he debtor and the Bankruptcy Court should not be able to short circuit the requirements of
Chapter 11.”13 “It is well-established that courts may not approve settlements that have the effect
of a sub rosa plan and accomplish an ‘end run around the protection granted [to] creditors in
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.’”14 Structured dismissals are frequently used as the debtor’s
“exit-strategy” post-363 sale which has its own procedural safeguards, including notice and an
opportunity for creditors to be heard, to ensure that the sale itself does not contain secret
elements, although a sale could nonetheless become sub rosa on other grounds.15
ii. Section 349 of the Bankruptcy Code Should not be Read Broadly
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In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 495 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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Id. (emphasis in original).
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In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 466 (2d Cir. 2007); Braniff, 700 F.2d at 940.
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In re Biolitec, Inc., 528 B.R. 261, 272 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014) (quoting In re Cont’t Air Lines, Inc., 780 F.2d 1223,
1224 (5th Cir. 1986)).
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See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2018).
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The introductory language of section 349 (a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that “[u]nless
the court, for cause, orders otherwise, the dismissal of a case under [title 11] does not bar []
discharge.” Contradictory interpretations of this section have impacted the perceived
permissibility of structured dismissals. Broad interpretations of section 349 allow courts to
consider a structured dismissal as an “appropriate resolution” to a case although “not expressly
provided for in the code.”16 Those who object to structure dismissals submit that a broad
interpretation of section 349’s introductory language allows the exception to swallow the rule.
However, the objectors’ approach looks only to the textual implication of reading section 349(b)
to permit structured dismissals and does not give thought to the practical implications. 17
Furthermore, this textual argument is undermined by an analysis of the legislative history. 18
In addition, other sections of the Bankruptcy Code, which courts rely on to justify their
discretion to approve structured dismissals, echo this same legislative intent. First, section 305
(a) provides courts with the discretion to “dismiss a case…if the interests of creditors and the
debtor would be better served” by a dismissal. 19 Second, section 1112 (b)(1) also allows a court
the choice to “convert or dismiss a chapter 11 case,” “whichever is in the best interests of
creditors and the estate.”20 This broad reading of the Bankruptcy Code not only aligns with the
legislative intent of the drafters, but also grants bankruptcy judges broad discretion to accomplish
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See Biolitec, 528 B.R. 269.
See e.g., In re KG Winddown, LLC, 638 B.R. 739, 748 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021) (finding cause for dismissal
where the debtor sold substantially all of its assets, ceased operations, and had insufficient resources to fund a plan
and alternatives explicitly permitted in the Bankruptcy Code are not in the best interest of creditors and the estate).
18
See H.R. REP. NO. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 338 (1977) (suggesting that the purpose of the language in section
349(b) was to give courts discretion over the scope of dismissal “to protect rights acquired in reliance on the
bankruptcy case” for example, in a sale).
19
11 U.S.C. § 305(a).
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11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1).
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the goals of the bankruptcy — to best meet the interests of the debtor and its creditors by
maximizing value — through structured dismissals.21
iii. Structured Dismissals Were a Permissible Means to Resolve a Chapter 11
Bankruptcy Before the Rise of “Free and Clear” Sales
Longstanding belief told us that there were only three ways in which a chapter 11 bankruptcy
could exit: “(1) confirmation of a plan (…includ[ing] a liquidating plan); (2) conversion to
chapter 7; or (3) dismissal. 22 However, the rise of “free and clear” sales of substantially all of a
business’s assets” under section 363 (f) of the Bankruptcy Code changed this and made structure
dismissals a new norm. 23 Bankruptcy sales under section 363 (f) of the Bankruptcy Code are
sometimes pursued in a chapter 11 case in lieu of a plan of reorganization or in conjunction with
a plan.24 A sale’s approval is not akin to plan’s confirmation, because sales and plans are
inherently different under title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, structured dismissals are often
useful to facilitate the final stage of the sale process under section 363 after closing but could
also be used in other instances including when parties are unable to confirm a chapter 11 plan. 25
“Traditional dismissal” is not a viable end to a 363 sale because “pursuant to [section] 349
(b), dismissal generally returns the debtor to the status quo ante, as if the bankruptcy case had
not been filed.”26 Section 349 (b)’s requirements for dismissal are averse to the sale process
because after a sale closes, the sale is final. 27 While this “hybrid dismissal and confirmation
order” is not explicitly authorized in the Bankruptcy Code, they are “an increasingly common
approach to concluding a chapter 11 case in which parties are unable to confirm a plan” because
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See H.R. REP. NO. 595.
In re Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 979 (2017) (“chapter 11 foresees three possible outcomes.”).
23
See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f).
24
See, e.g., In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1065 (2d Cir. 1983).
25
See ABI Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, 2012-2104, Final Report and Recommendations, n.973
(2014), available at commission.abi.org/full-report.
26
See 11 U.S.C. § 349(b).
27
See 11 U.S.C. § 363(m).
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they resolve the case using the tools provided in bankruptcy — namely free and clear sales.28
These new-age chapter 11 resolutions evolved to maximize value and minimize cost which gets
at the heart of what a chapter 11 reorganization is under the Bankruptcy Code. The value that
free and clear sales, and accordingly structured dismissals, present in chapter 11 cases, along
with their respective textual hooks in the Bankruptcy Code, solidified their permissibility in
Jevic.29
D. Circuit Courts’ Reluctance to Extend Jevic
Both the First and Eighth Circuits have refused to extend the Supreme Court’s holding in
Jevic to section 363 sales.30 The First Circuit Court of Appeals, in In re Old Cold, LLC,
addressed the extent to which the Jevic rule, disallowing structured dismissals that violate the
priority scheme, acted as an exception to the equitable mootness doctrine codified in section 363
(m).31 There, the First Circuit held that the appeal at issue, which was governed by section 363
(m) of the Bankruptcy Code, did not stem from the sale and subsequent structured dismissal, and
thus Jevic was inapplicable.32 While the First Circuit did not have to get to the issue of whether it
could delineate between the sale itself and the structured dismissals because the appeal in this
case did not stem from either the sale or the structured dismissal, other courts have decided the
issue.
In 2019, two years after Jevic, and just one year after Old Cold, the Eighth Circuit explicitly
refused to extend Jevic’s heightened importance of the absolute priority rule. 33 In In re Veg
Liquidation, Inc, the court took the step that the First Circuit could not in Old Cold, by

28

See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 979 (2017).
Id. at 978.
30
See Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Old Cold, LLC (In re Old Cold, LLC), 879 F.3d 376 (1st Cir. 2018); All
Veg, LLC v. Fifth Third Equipment Finance Co. (In re Veg Liquidation, Inc.), 931 F.3d 730 (8th Cir. 2019).
31
In re Old Cold, LLC, 879 F.3d at 388.
32
Id. (“Since this case does not arise from an appeal of the Sale Order, Jevic has no application.”).
33
See In re Veg Liquidation, Inc., 931 F.3d at 739.
29
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differentiating between the sale and the structured dismissal for purposes of the applicability of
Jevic.34 The First Circuit refused to set the precedent that free and clear sales, while often
associated with structured dismissals at their close, are governed equally by Jevic to prohibit the
approval of sales that do not conform to the basic priority rules. 35 The Eighth Circuit, in In re
Veg Liquidation, demonstrated its reluctance to limit bankruptcy tools which maximize value,
even in the wake of the Supreme Court’s treatment of the absolute priority rule as somewhat of a
“super-maxim” of bankruptcy.
While courts are forced to live with the Jevic decision, they are reluctant to extend the
Supreme Court’s holding and further limit their own discretion. Specifically, courts are unwilling
to give the absolute priority rule heightened credence in the bankruptcy sales context, despite
being closely tied to structured dismissals. After Jevic, courts have tried to maintain the broad
discretion various sections of the Bankruptcy Code bestow on them and are unlikely to change
any time soon.
Conclusion
Generally, Courts have accepted structured dismissals as a means to an efficient end
where it was in the best interest of the debtor and its creditors long before the Supreme Court
considered the permissibility of structured dismissals in 2017. Accordingly, courts have largely
refused to extend Jevic’s limiting principles beyond the absolute priority rule as prescribed by
the Supreme Court. Within the written Bankruptcy Code, and general practices in chapter 11,
there are competing goals and rules which seem to limit the means to an end that satisfies these

Id. (“For one thing, Jevic involved a structured dismissal and did not hold that § 363 sales must conform to normal
priority rules.”).
35
See, e.g., id. (“In fact, the Court noted that some courts in other contexts have approved priority-violating
distributions where they serve ‘significant Code-related objectives,’ such as maximizing the value of the bankruptcy
estate.”). Id. (quoting Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 985).
34
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bankruptcy maxims. At this point, despite the lower courts’ disagreement, the Supreme Court has
rendered the absolute priority rule a super-maxim. However, lower courts have and will likely
continue to limit the reach of Jevic’s holding to the absolute priority rule where it could stand to
inhibit opportunities to maximize value in the chapter 11 process through free and clear sales
followed by a structured dismissal of the case.
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